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Martin Luther succinctly summarized his theology in sola statements,
such as sola scriptura, viewing the Bible (scriptura) as the only valid
source of information about God rather than what he viewed as the
extraneous, corrupting church doctrine of the time. As a secular side
effect of this focus on individual reading skills, the Protestant terri-
tories were the first to acquire high literacy rates, which subse-
quently fostered health, economic growth, and good governance.
Here I argue that a similar priority focus on empowerment of all
segments of all populations through education and health (sola
schola et sanitate) is needed today for sustainable development.
According to decades of research, education and health are essential
prerequisites for ending poverty and hunger, for improving institu-
tions and participation in society, for voluntary fertility declines and
ending world population growth, for changing behavior and adop-
tion of new and clean technologies, and for enhancing adaptive
capacity to already unavoidable climate change. This approach
avoids paternalistic imposition of development policies by focusing
external aid on enabling people to help themselves, their families,
and communities. Prioritizing education and health also helps move
more industrialized, aging societies from a focus on material con-
sumption to one on quality of life. Sola schola et sanitate suggests
that well-being will increasingly be based on health, continued men-
tal stimulation, and consumption of cultural products, rather than
fossil fuels and materials. Thus, cognition—or brain power—can be
viewed as the zero-emissions energy for sustainable development.
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On October 31, 1517, Martin Luther released his famous 95Theses, which openly challenged church authorities on the
practice of selling indulgences. This happened in a period of tran-
sition in Europe with Humanism and Renaissance culture spread-
ing, new discoveries being made in geography and science, and the
printing machine revolutionizing communication. But this specific
date is widely considered as the start of the Protestant Reformation,
which triggered a series of highly consequential religious, political,
and socioeconomic developments, not only for Germany but also
for the world. In particular, the Reformatory emphasis on universal
literacy, allowing all women and men alike to read the Bible
themselves, led to far-reaching changes. As I will discuss below, this
spread of education has ever since been a key factor in the advance
of health and technology, subsequent economic growth, and lasting
improvements in human living conditions.
On September 25, 2015, the political leaders of the world as-
sembled at the United Nations in New York and defined a set of 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including 169 specific
targets that were approved by 193 countries. This followed an ex-
tensive international consultation process, with hundreds of dis-
cussion fora around the world, including governments and civil
society. The resulting set of goals updated the earlier eight Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) and significantly expanded
their scope. Importantly, the SDGs do not only apply to developing
countries but are formulated as (nonbinding) commitments for all
193 countries. Will these global goals that have been endorsed by
the broadest possible coalition of governments and civil society
around the world trigger a globally transformative power compa-
rable to the teachings of a single monk 500 y ago?
Although the answer to this question will only be known in
retrospect, it is possible to make some informed observations about
the preconditions for success. Here I will propose and discuss the
thesis that a successful global transition to sustainability will re-
quire as a necessary prerequisite the emphasis on core priorities,
similar to Luther’s famous sola principles, rather than the tech-
nocratic implementation of 169 diverse targets. In Medieval Latin,
sola fide emphasized that salvation can only come through direct
faith in God, without the mediation of saints or having to worry
about the countless behavioral norms defined by the church. It has
been called the all-decisive core of the Reformation (1), with ev-
erything else—including moral behavior and the organization of
many aspects of life—following from this first principle. Such a
focus on decisive first principles from which everything else follows
was key to the transformative power of the Reformation and, I
would argue, could again be the key today for the transition nec-
essary for securing sustainable well-being. Education and health for
all—sola schola et sanitate—can be viewed as such first principles,
which present ends in themselves (i.e., they have intrinsic value)
and are essential means and key catalysts for pursuing the rest of
the sustainable development agenda (i.e., they have instrumental
value). They are essential prerequisites for enabling people to
eradicate poverty, to organize their societies in equitable ways, to
control those in power, and to manage the planet in a way that
allows all humans to prosper for many generations to come.
Significance
In 2015, all countries of the world agreed to an ambitious set of
17 Sustainable Development Goals, including 169 specific
targets. Whether these goals will be achieved and lead to the
desired sustainability transition will depend on the degree to
which they can energize and mobilize policy makers, donors,
nongovernmental organizations, private industry, and the pub-
lic. There is a fear that this rather technocratic set of 169 over-
lapping and partly contradictory targets lacks the sense of clear
priority that is needed. This paper proposes a clear priority focus
on human capital (education and health) as a root cause of de-
velopment that, together with maintaining natural capital, is
prerequisite for all other Sustainable Development Goals, of-
fering a vision for an achievable and sustainable future.
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This first principle puts people first, who—enabled through health
and education—will become empowered to not only help them-
selves and others, but also to manage our societies, our economies,
and our planet sustainably. In the context of sustainability science (2)
and the distinction between the relative contributions of human
capital, natural capital, and produced capital to sustainability or the
InclusiveWealth Index, this is fully in line with the empirical findings
that under current conditions, changes in education and health have
by far the highest impact (3, 4). In other words, just as the in-
strumental value of reading was recognized by the Protestant
movement as a way to enable salvation, I would argue that the in-
ternational community should recognize the instrumental value of
education and health as a way to enable sustainable development.
In this paper, I will elaborate the science behind this people-
centered view of sustainable development by building on an ex-
tension of my own scientific discipline, demography, which I like to
define as the mathematics of groups of people. Demography not
only has human beings and their characteristics at the very center
of its analytical models, but it also has the longest prediction ho-
rizon of all social sciences because of the fact that the average
lifespan of humans today is 70–80 y and many relevant character-
istics of people are formed at a young age and thereafter remain
fixed. The resulting model of demographic metabolism can quan-
titatively show how societies gradually change through the re-
placement of generations (5). This will be illustrated here in terms
of the dynamics of human capital formation: that is, the changing
number of people by health status and education/skills.
A concentration of development efforts on basic health and
education for all also has an important policy dimension in en-
hancing equity within countries and between countries. Not so
many decades ago the world was split into colonial powers and
their colonies and some scholars claim that this power gradient still
exists today, largely between richer and poorer countries. Hence,
implementing predefined development goals through international
organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, as
well as aid agencies of the rich countries, suggests to some ob-
servers a technocratic top-down approach that has been labeled
“The Tyranny of Experts” (6). Some authors go as far as to claim
that on balance international aid has done more harm than good to
local communities, including the strengthening of corrupt elites (7).
But even if some of these allegations are justified, the suggestion to
stop all aid throws the baby out with the bathwater. Acquisition of
basic health and education enables populations in developing
countries to define their own priorities and organize their societies
accordingly: it helps people to help themselves.
In this Inaugural article I will take a very long-term and broad
perspective on development. I will not only reach back 500 y, but
also look forward many decades, through discussing alternative
possible narratives and associated numerical scenarios for the 21st
century. This paper emphasizes the fundamental role education
and health play in sustainable development by presenting scientific
evidence regarding how human capital leads to different dimen-
sions of development, including economic growth, good institu-
tions, demographic transition, and enhancement of adaptive
capacity. I will also address the causal mechanisms described in the
neurological literature, through which schooling enhances cogni-
tive functioning through increasing the synaptic density in relevant
parts of the brain, thus influencing our perceptions, time horizons,
and our behavior. Because global health has recently received
much more international attention and funding than education,
here I will give more attention to the latter, although both have to
be viewed as a closely related couple of empowerment and quality
of life. I will conclude by pointing out that sola schola et sanitate is
also a valid priority for the most industrialized countries, moving
the emphasis away from material consumption to a focus on
quality of life. All this will show how brain power is the potentially
unlimited zero-emissions energy for a sustainable future.
Reformatory Emphasis on Literacy for All
For most of the 5,000 y since writing was introduced in Meso-
potamia and Egypt to keep simple accounts about stocks of grain
delivered and other administrative purposes, literacy skills tended
to be restricted to a tiny elite. Literacy was primarily limited to
religious leaders, state servants, far-traveling traders, members of
specialized guilds, and certain nobility (8). There are two known
exceptions to this: in ancient Athens in the 5th century BCE and in
15th century towns in Tuscany. In both cases, there were in-
teresting interactions with democracy in the way in which being
able to write (e.g., the name of a person who should be ostracized
by the assembly of the demos of Athens) was a prerequisite for
exerting democratic rights, and conversely, the rights were an in-
centive to acquire basic literacy (9). It should be noted, however,
that in both cases the skills and rights were limited to the male
population that held rights of citizenship, a minority of the total
population.
At least since the time of Confucius 2,500 y ago, some scholars
have expressed the hope that all people should get the opportunity
for education, but Martin Luther seems to have been the first to
consistently and successfully campaign for all ordinary people—
women as well as men—to be taught to read (and write). Luther’s
motivation for this was primarily religious because he was convinced
that human salvation was only possible through a personal re-
lationship with God, which in turn could only be achieved if be-
lievers were able to read the Bible for themselves. This was why
Luther translated the Bible into a German vernacular that every-
body could understand. However, because few people at the time
were able to read or write, Luther made the establishment of
schools for everybody in Germany a priority. In the spring of 1524
Luther wrote his pamphlet, “To the Councilmen of all cities in the
German lands, that they should establish and maintain Christian
schools” (10). In this work, Luther called for children to be taught
more than was necessary for earning their daily bread. This is a
very important foundation for the later spread of literacy in the
Protestant territories, where it preceded economic growth, thus
challenging the frequent assumption made by economists that the
spread of education was a consequence of responding to economic
incentives. It can be shown that almost universally the spread of
literacy for noneconomic reasons preceded economic growth (11).
It was for religious and not economic reasons that Luther and his
closest associate, Melanchton, wanted every boy and girl—including
“das geringste Mägdelein” (“the lowest level maid”)—to be able to
read the Bible.
It is worth noting that this ambition was not shared by the leading
intellectuals of his time. Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536), the
most influential Humanist of the early modern era, was in fact
highly critical of Luther’s vulgarization of education, which was
highly suspect to the elitist Humanists used to communicating in
Latin and Greek. To spread the word, Luther made extensive use of
the new media of his time, printing his tracts and pamphlets in the
form of leaflets, posters, and broadsheets. Thanks to the printing
press, invented and operationalized by Johannes Gutenberg (1400–
1486), and the post coach system, these could be sent from Wit-
tenberg to anywhere in the German Empire within a matter of days
(11). No wonder Luther praised book printing as “God’s highest
and greatest gift of grace” (12). The introduction of compulsory
schooling for all girls and boys clearly followed the Reformation
and was introduced in Protestant areas from 1592 onward.
As a consequence of this emphasis on universal literacy, the
Protestant territories in Northern Europe gradually became the
most literate populations of the world, although there were some
interruptions, such as the Thirty Years’ War. In fact, one could
argue that the rise of The Netherlands and England as colonial
powers, and the parallel decline of the much less-educated Catholic
powers of Spain and Portugal, were in part because of this factor
(11). Statistics from The Netherlands show that already around
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1600, two-thirds of men in the cities could read and write. Around
1850, about 80% of the population—including those in rural re-
gions—were literate. The same thing happened in England, where
around 1800 60% of all men and 40% of all women could read and
write (13). Looking at a map of Europe around 1870, the clear
association between literacy and religion is evident (13). The
Protestant territories of Sweden, Germany, The Netherlands, and
Great Britain are undisputed leaders with literacy rates of around
80% at this time. They are followed by France, which after the
French Revolution (during which the Catholic Church became less
central) managed to raise its literacy rate to 69%. Austria and
Ireland (both Catholic) rank after France. Italy and Spain (both
Catholic) lag a long way behind, with rates below 35%. Russia
reaches 15% literacy and Turkey 9%.
This ranking by level of literacy in 1870 matches almost exactly
the degree of economic development at that time. Interestingly,
recent research suggests that this association of religion and de-
velopment is not so much attributable to Max Weber’s famously
hypothesized effect of “Protestant Ethics,” but that the economic
head start of Protestant regions can be more easily and more di-
rectly explained by their better-educated populations (14). In fact,
the French sociologist, Emmanuel Todd (15), describes the prog-
ress of humankind as a direct function of the spread of literacy in
populations. Comparing the evolution of literacy rates around the
world, Todd suggests that a critical threshold for socioeconomic
change and even political revolutions is reached around the point
when 50% of male adults are literate. He sees the progress of
human history as driven by the progress of the human mind, with
the slow rise of literacy being even more influential in the long run
than the Industrial Revolution.
The hypothesis that literacy of broad segments of the population
is a necessary prerequisite and root cause of subsequent economic
development (16) is also consistent with evidence outside of
Europe. Goldin and Katz (17) describe how the United States
became the world’s best-educated population by the early 20th
century, mostly through public education, and that this was the
decisive prerequisite for becoming the leading economic and po-
litical power by midcentury. This description is fully consistent with
the rise of Japan, which in the late 19th century under the Meiji
Dynasty started to copy the Protestant European school system
and, already in 1900, had a primary school enrollment rate of 90%.
The resulting educated young adult population was the basis for
Japan becoming the leading economic and military power in Asia
during the first half of the 20th century. The experience of the
“Asian Tigers,” such as South Korea and Singapore, further il-
lustrates this pattern, where massive expansion in human capital
after World War II preceded rapid economic growth. An early
emphasis on universal female basic education was also the key
policy for the island of Mauritius, which in the 1960s served as a
textbook example of a country trapped in the vicious circle of
poverty, high population growth, and environmental destruction,
to become one of the most highly developed countries in the Af-
rican region today (18).
How Human Capital Fosters Economic Growth and Better
Institutions
Human capital is a fundamental prerequisite for economic prog-
ress and good institutions, key components of sustainable devel-
opment. At the level of individuals, empirical evidence shows
beyond any reasonable doubt that more years of schooling, on
average, lead to higher income. This pattern can be found in vir-
tually all countries, and discussions only concern the specific pat-
terns or changes over time in this so-called education premium.
However, at the macroeconomic level, empirical evidence relating
changes in education measures to economic growth has been
rather ambiguous until recently. Many authors suggested that this
may be because of problems with the global empirical data on
human capital (19–21). Indeed, the usual human capital indicator
in the form of mean years of schooling of the entire adult pop-
ulation does not adequately reflect recent improvements of the
education of younger cohorts. As Fig. 1 illustrates, under condi-
tions of very rapid education expansion the young adult cohorts,
who are decisive for economic growth, can already be highly ed-
ucated, whereas the mean years of education indicator can still be
depressed through the still uneducated older cohorts. In analyses
that explicitly consider the age structure of human capital growth,
regressions unambiguously confirm the key role of human capital
in economic growth (22). In addition, using the full range of the
educational attainment distribution by age in economic growth
regressions (i.e., the colored population pyramids as shown in Fig.
1) results in findings of great policy relevance: for poor countries
with very low levels of education, only the combination of universal
primary education with broadly based secondary education results
in the kind of rapid economic growth that has the potential to push
countries out of poverty (22). This important insight is also
reflected in the SDGs: whereas the earlier MDGs only called for
universal primary education, SDG4 calls for universal high-quality
primary and secondary education.
Another series of recent studies highlights the importance of
improving education for the quality of institutions. Some develop-
ment economists see institutions as the key factor for development
(23), but good institutions do not fall from heaven nor can they be
imposed from outside; rather, they are gradually built up by in-
formed and empowered people. The same is true for the spread of
liberal democracies. Following Lipset (24), an increasing level of
education helps individuals to develop a stronger sense of civic duty
and greater interest in politics, thus leading to more political par-
ticipation. Several empirical studies indeed find a positive asso-
ciation between education and democracy even after controlling
the possible effects of economic growth (25, 26). Comprehensive
econometric studies based on age-specific educational attainment
distributions of men and women in 120 countries since 1970, and
also controlling for gross domestic product per capita, the in-
vestment rate, life expectancy, the urbanization rate, the share of
agricultural output on total output, and the change in the young-age
dependency ratio, show several interesting findings: societies with
high proportions of young people tend to have a lower probability
of achieving democratic regimes; increases in urbanization and in-
vestment tend to lead to political changes in the direction of de-
mocratization; and education turns out to be a significant and
robust determinant of democracy. With respect to gender differ-
entials, the findings also show that an increase in female relative to
male education is a robust predictor of changes toward more
democratic rights (27). Many of the empirical findings concerning
the benefits of expanding education depend on a proper consid-
eration of changing human capital by age-cohort and gender. This is
where demographic models can make an important contribution.
Fig. 1. Reconstructed age and education pyramids for China 1970–1990–2010.
Note: Population under 15-y-old represented by gray color not disaggregated
by educational attainment.
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The Demographic Metabolism Model of Social Change
Through Cohort Replacement
Multidimensional demographic methods can model how societies
change as a consequence of changes in population composition by
important human characteristics. For example, in any given soci-
ety, the individual characteristic literacy does not change for all
members of the population at once. Literacy is typically acquired
in youth and then maintained throughout the life course. At the
population level, this implies a gradual process during which first
the proportion of literate young people increases, who then move
up the age pyramid in a predictable way, whereby they step-by-step
increase the proportion of those who are literate among the adult
population. The multidimensional model capturing such dynamics
has been labeled “demographic metabolism” (5), a model which is
demographic in its approach and origin but can be applied far
beyond what are conventionally considered to be demographic
questions. This model is a tool for quantitative social forecasting at
a time scale of several decades, a horizon needed for discussions
of sustainable development priorities.
Demography is the scientific discipline that studies the changing
size and composition of populations. Historically, demography
developed out of what used to be called “political arithmetic.” It
has a long tradition of forecasting future population trends for
various government functions, ranging from military to health to
social security systems. For modeling population dynamics, tradi-
tionally, populations were assumed to be fully homogeneous and
projections were simply done by applying an assumed growth rate
to a given initial population size. Because the base population is
growing over time, this implies a model of exponential population
growth. Although birth and death rates vary strongly with age, in
case of rather stable age structures this provides a useful approxi-
mation and it is still widely used (e.g., in animal demography).
However, for human populations after the beginning of fertility
declines and the strong fluctuations in births and deaths associated
with World War I, the Spanish Flu, and the Great Depression, age
structures in Europe had become very irregular. As a consequence,
most population projections since the middle of the 20th century
have been based on an age-specific model, called the “cohort-
component model,” which projects populations along cohort
lines (e.g., the cohort aged 20–24 y in 2015 becomes 25–29 y in
2020) based on assumptions for the three components of pop-
ulation change: fertility, mortality, and migration. Currently, pop-
ulation projection models that differentiate populations by age and
gender still dominate the field. However, multidimensional pop-
ulation models can subdivide populations by many other relevant
and observable individual characteristics: that is, sources of het-
erogeneity that influence population dynamics. These models also
forecast along cohort lines: for example, the proportion of women
with high school graduation aged 25–29 y in 2015 is a good pre-
dictor of 60- to 64-y-old women with high school graduation in
2050, after accounting for mortality and migration. Because in
most populations both fertility and mortality tend to vary greatly
with level of education, explicitly accounting for educational dif-
ferences also changes the population forecasts themselves (28).
This model of population change along cohort lines has recently
been generalized to a model of social change with predictive power,
called demographic metabolism (5). Building on earlier work of the
sociologist Karl Mannheim (29) and the demographer Norman
Ryder (30), this concept operationalizes the age-old view that so-
cieties change as a function of young generations, which are dif-
ferent in relevant ways, successively replacing older ones. For
Ryder, intercohort change was the only source of progress and, in
his view, “a population whose members were immortal would re-
semble a stagnant pond” (31). In recent generalizations this model
also allows people to move from one subpopulation to another (e.g.,
from secondary to tertiary education), thus combining transitions
over the life course, with the effect of intercohort replacement (5).
These movements between different subcategories of each cohort
can be described through a set of age- and gender-specific transition
probabilities (32). Hence, the model of demographic metabolism
can analytically describe and, under certain assumptions, forecast
how societies change as a consequence of compositional changes in
relevant and measureable characteristics of their members.
This compositional change through successive generational re-
placement can be illustrated in the form of 3D age pyramids. For
the case of China, Fig. 1 shows in different colors the proportions
of men and women in different age groups who have different
levels of education. In the figure, one specific cohort is highlighted
through blue lines across the different pyramids to better illustrate
this upward movement of identical cohorts with the passage of
time. In 1970, China was still an extremely poor developing
country with a fertility rate of more than six children per woman
and, as a consequence, a very young age structure, with more than
half of the population below 20 y of age. The red color on the right
(female) side of the pyramid also shows that the vast majority of
Chinese women had no formal education at all. Only for the young
age cohorts does the expansion of basic education that had started
in the 1940s show an increase in the proportion with some primary
or junior secondary education. As in virtually all countries, the
education expansion started first for men and only later extended
to women, and this is why in every age cohort men have somewhat
higher education than women.
For the pyramid in 1990 in Fig. 1, we see that the entire edu-
cation pattern has essentially moved up the age pyramid by 20 y. In
1990, the better-educated younger cohorts had reached the main
working age, which was also an important factor driving the rapid
economic growth that started after the economic policy reform of
1979. By 2010, the education structure had moved up another 20 y
and, as a consequence of improved female education together with
the Chinese family planning policy, the birth rates strongly de-
clined. Over the last half century, the demographic metabolism
process has fundamentally transformed Chinese society.
The demographic metabolism model does not only hold for the
changing educational composition but can be applied to other
relevant characteristics that tend to be persistent along cohort
lines. For example, younger generations who get environmental
education and hold more postmaterialistic values than the older
ones (33) can be expected to gradually change the overall envi-
ronmental attitudes of societies as they move up the age pyramid.
The model has already been applied numerically to forecasting the
changing prevalence of attitudes toward gender roles (34, 35),
homosexuality (36), and European identity (37), where younger
and older birth cohorts differ mainly because younger generations
were socialized in different social environments. Based on this
model, it has recently been shown that the fact that young people
across Europe express to a greater extent a European identity on
top of their national ones has been the reason for the expanding
prevalence of European identity and will likely continue in the
future, irrespective of current political turmoil in the European
Union (38). In general, this model works well for deeply rooted
attitudes and identities that are formed at young age, and are
largely maintained throughout the rest of life. Its predictive power
is much weaker for volatile specific opinions and behaviors.
The Causal Mechanism: What Education Does to Our Brains
and Our Behavior
Outside of education research, social scientists often view educa-
tion as just one dimension of social stratification that is a conse-
quence of the class structure of society. Economists tend to see it
primarily as an investment made to get higher wages on the labor
market. Although educationists have long conceptualized educa-
tion as an independent force that changes the way we perceive the
world and behave, outside of the field this view has rarely taken
hold. However, there is no doubt that education effects our cog-
nitive functioning, affects our behaviors, and at the same time
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equips us with better social and economic opportunities. Most
directly, the mental stimulation experienced when learning—be it
in school or through informal channels—enhances cognitive de-
velopment through increasing the synaptic density in relevant parts
of the brain (39). Many experimental and observational studies
have provided confirmation of a robust effect of education on
executive functioning and cognitive abilities (40–42); neuro-
cognitive and neuroimaging studies have also shown strong asso-
ciations between adaptive changes in the brain and learning
experience in classrooms (43). Abstract cognitive skills, such as
categorization and logical deduction acquired through schooling,
enhance the way educated individuals reason, solve problems, as-
sess risks, and make decisions (44). This has been most extensively
documented with respect to the well-established causal link from
education to health (45, 46).
Education, Health, and Income
When studying the complex interactions between education,
health, and income and the associated questions concerning the
direction of causality and possible endogeneity, it is essential to
distinguish between education flows (schooling) and education
stocks (human capital). Attending school and successfully gradu-
ating can depend, among many other factors, on the health status
of the child as well as on household income and national economic
growth. However, once a person reaches his or her highest edu-
cational attainment, this by definition stays invariant over the rest
of the life cycle and cannot any more be influenced by other fac-
tors. At the same time, human capital (educational attainment) can
influence health-related behavior as well as economic productivity
for the rest of the life cycle. Hence, there is a causal effect from
human capital (stock) to health and income, but no simultaneous
effect in the opposite direction. Income and health can only in-
fluence schooling (flow), which only changes average human capital
with a delay of several decades.
Clearly, a certain minimum level of physical health is necessary
for a child to develop mentally and to be able to attend school.
Particularly in developing countries, school absenteeism as a result
of poor health of the children themselves or of family members
they have to care for, is a serious handicap for improving levels of
education and, consequently, the building of key cognitive skills and
raising learning outcomes. Environmental factors, such as air pol-
lution, can also have serious implications on cognitive develop-
ment, thus constituting an effect of the depletion of natural capital
on human capital formation (47). The cognitive skills resulting
from education and the health status of a person are both em-
bodied in individuals, in contrast to income, which is not embodied.
In virtually all countries of the world, more educated mothers
experience lower child mortality. However, because often more
educated people also live in richer households, the question arises:
What is more important for child survival in developing countries,
mothers’ education or household income/wealth? This has been
the explicit focus of a series of studies using the widest existing
individual-level dataset by pooling the samples of Demographic
and Health Surveys in 43 developing countries (48, 49). Using
multilevel regression models, the analysis of the relative effects of
mother’s education and economic resources on infant mortality
shows that both within families and within communities, the effect
of education clearly dominates over income/wealth.
The empirical evidence is equally compelling for the effect of
education on adult mortality. In virtually all countries for which
data exist, more educated people have higher life expectancies (50).
The differences vary in extent among countries and are generally
greater for men than for women. Among industrialized countries,
mortality differentials tend to be lowest in Southern European
countries—presumably because of the healthy Mediterranean diet
of all social strata—and are highest in Eastern Europe. In Russia,
the difference in life expectancy between the highest and lowest
education groups among adult men is up to 12 y (50). It has even
been shown that the overall decline in life expectancy that Russian
men experienced over the 1990s was driven by a strong decline
among the lower education groups, whereas the highest groups
continued to enjoy moderate increases (51). In virtually all in-
dustrialized countries for which data are available, the education
differentials in adult mortality increased over time despite im-
proving health care coverage in most countries (50). For the United
States it was shown that the recent rise in morbidity and mortality
in midlife among white non-Hispanics has been concentrated
among the low-education groups (52). For China, a new study
finds large and increasing educational gradients in a context of
broadly declining mortality (53).
One possible explanation for this pattern lies in the increasing
importance of lifestyle-related factors for which education seems
to be more important than the healthcare system. This positive
effect of education on longevity even seems to hold for the very top
of the education distribution, as shown for members of national
academies of sciences. Because good records exist for most learned
societies about the age of death of their members, these historical
time series have been compared with that of the general pop-
ulation (54). Fig. 2 plots the remaining life expectancy at age 60 y
for members of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (previously
Imperial Academy of Vienna) since 1870 and compares it to that
of the general male population of Austria (in earlier times all
Academy members were men). Interestingly, up to World War II,
academicians had almost no survival advantage, even though they
included some of the world’s foremost physicians at the time. Over
recent decades, however, a clear advantage for academicians
emerged, who now have a remaining life expectancy at age 60 y
that is even 3–4 y longer than the general male population with at
least a Master’s degree. It has been suggested that this survival
advantage is not a result of selectivity or better access to medical
care, but rather because of continued demanding mental activities
to very high ages (55).
Better health and longer lives are not only closely linked to ed-
ucation and cognitive capacity but also in turn directly affect eco-
nomic growth. A burgeoning body of literature shows that health is
not only a direct source of human welfare but also a driver of
income growth. In particular, three mechanisms have been defined:
(i) better health, leading to higher labor productivity; (ii) better
childhood health, leading to better school attendance and cognitive
development; and (iii) a longer expected life span, leading to more
savings and investment. Empirical studies also find that good health
has a positive, sizable, and statistically significant effect on aggregate
Fig. 2. Trend in life expectancy at age 60 y in Austria since 1850 for the
general population, as well as members of the Austrian Academy of Sciences
and the entire population with an academic degree (only male populations).
Data from Winkler-Dworak (54).
Lutz PNAS Early Edition | 5 of 10
SU
ST
A
IN
A
BI
LI
TY
SC
IE
N
CE
IN
A
U
G
U
RA
L
A
RT
IC
LE
output, even when the experience of the work force is being
controlled for (56). The WHO-sponsored report of the Com-
mission on Macroeconomics and Health (57) also highlighted
the importance of basic health for poverty reduction by showing
how the burden of diseases in some low-income countries, es-
pecially in sub-Saharan Africa, stands as a stark barrier to economic
growth, and therefore should be addressed centrally in any com-
prehensive development strategy.
Is there a feedback from economic growth to higher school
enrolment? Based on the timing of changes, the global historical
evidence in industrialized countries and in developing countries
today suggests that improved basic education was generally more a
function of political will rather than rising incomes. With a strong
political will cost becomes secondary because primary school
teachers in poor countries do not earn much and village schools
can be rather primitive. The expansion of higher education, on the
other hand, does require a certain degree of economic develop-
ment to pay for it, and also to offer appropriate jobs for the
graduates in which they can use their skills productively. This in-
teraction between income and education can work as a self-
reinforcing beneficial circle of development—as demonstrated by
the Asian Tigers and by Mauritius in the African context (16, 18)—
but it does require a strong initial focus on universal basic edu-
cation. Investing in elitist education amid illiteracy has not worked
well in South Asia and many parts of Africa.
Girls’ Education and Fertility Decline
It has been long established in demography that education is one
of the most important, if not the single most important covariate of
both fertility and mortality/health. Consistent patterns of fertility
differentials by mothers’ education have been found frommedieval
times to the present in virtually all countries and at very different
stages of economic developments (58). The differentials are par-
ticularly pronounced in countries during the process of demo-
graphic transition, when death rates have already fallen and birth
rates start to fall after a certain time lag (59). Only in recent years
in the Nordic countries does the gradient seem to flatten or show a
mild U-shape because more educated women can arrange their
lives better in a way to actually achieve the two-child norm, which
is still almost universal in Europe (60). More generally, the em-
powering effect of education brings women in high-fertility
settings to want fewer children and find effective ways to have
fewer children. They generally want fewer children for health
reasons, as many births at short intervals can be a major risk in the
absence of effective health services, and because of value change,
preferring fewer children who each will have better life chances,
and possibly because of higher opportunity costs. Furthermore,
better-educated women can better resist the traditional pronatalist
norms in their societies and resist the often higher fertility desires
of their husbands (61).
The empirical evidence for a strong fertility-reducing effect of
education in today’s high- and medium-fertility countries is over-
whelming, although there are some country-specific peculiarities.
Fig. 3 shows comparable data based on recent surveys (62) for
fertility levels (period indicator of children per woman) by moth-
ers’ education for six big countries with more than four children on
average. The two biggest countries, Nigeria and Ethiopia, show
almost linear slopes, with a similar gradient but at different abso-
lute levels. Nigeria shows around 6.6 children for women without
any formal education and 2.9 for those with postsecondary edu-
cation. In Ethiopia, these fertility rates are 5.0 and 1.1 respectively.
In Sudan and Pakistan the education gradients are a bit weaker but
still clearly pronounced. Similar strong education gradients can be
found with respect to desired family size and contraceptive use
(61). Studies on the causes of educational fertility differentials in
Africa consistently show that better-educated women want fewer
children, have greater autonomy in reproductive decision-making,
more knowledge about and access to contraception, and are more
motivated to use contraception (63).
These pervasive education differentials have also been in-
corporated into models of population dynamics that stratify pop-
ulations not only by age and sex but also by levels of education (28).
Because female education is associated with lower fertility at the
individual level, populations with higher proportions of better-
educated women have lower overall fertility rates. This fertility
factor by far outweighs the higher child survival rates associated
with better education of mothers, which works in the direction of
higher population growth. Combining both forces, better female
education will lead to a sizable long-term reduction in the pop-
ulation growth rates. A quantification of the pure education effect
has shown that assuming identical sets of education-specific fertility
trajectories for all countries, a scenario assuming constant school
enrollment results in a world population size by 2050 that is 1 bil-
lion higher than under a scenario of rapid school expansion (28).
More recently, an effort to translate all relevant health and
education-specific targets specified in the SDGs into alternative
trajectories of world population growth by using the above-
described multidimensional demographic model resulted in a
peaking of world population around 2060 and a total size of be-
tween 8.2 and 8.7 billion in 2100, depending on different inter-
pretations of the education SGD (64). Because of the lower
Fig. 3. Total fertility rate (TFR) by education 2010–2015, for big countries with
TFR above 4.0. Data from Lutz et al. (62).
Fig. 4. Various population projections, various scenarios. Data from Abel
et al. (64).
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fertility associated with meeting the goals, this is significantly lower
than the world population of 11.2 billion projected for 2100 by the
United Nation’s medium variant and the 9.0 billion resulting from
the middle-of-the-road scenario shared socioeconomic pathway
(SSP)2, discussed next.
Alternative Scenarios for the 21st Century
These insights and methods of multidimensional population dy-
namics are also reflected in a new set of global scenarios developed
by the international climate change research community to com-
prehensively address the socioeconomic determinants of climate
change mitigation and adaptation. These SSPs are based on five
different storylines about future developments in all countries of
the world in terms of different demographic, social, economic, and
technological dimensions (65). The human core of the SSPs con-
sists of population scenarios by age, sex, and six different levels of
education (66). Fig. 4 shows the global-level results in terms of
total population size of three of the scenarios: SSP1, reflecting
rapid social development; SSP2, reflecting middle-of-the-road as-
sumptions; and SSP3, showing a scenario of stalled development.
In the following, I will only focus on the results for two big
countries, Nigeria and Pakistan, and contrast the SSP1 and SSP3
scenarios. Nigeria currently has a population of around 180 million,
which is still growing at a rate of over 2.5% per year because of an
average fertility rate of around six children per woman and a very
young age distribution. As Fig. 5 indicates, almost half of the
population is below the age of 15 and 40% of the adult population
has never been to school. The SSP3 narrative of stalled social de-
velopment—including stalling school enrollment and little progress
in basic health care, including reproductive health—results in
continued high population growth to reach a population of
880 million people by the end of the century. Given the current civil
war in parts of the country, this is a not implausible scenario, which
actually is even lower than what the United Nations in 2012 pro-
jected as the most likely future of Nigeria. If, on the other hand,
recent improvements in school enrollment of girls in most of the
country continue and general socioeconomic developments take off
quickly, as expected by some observers, then the population might
only increase to half that size. And the education distribution
during the second half of the century would resemble that of
Europe today, with high proportions with secondary or tertiary
education. This finding could imply that in many other important
respects, ranging from income to the quality of institutions, Nigeria
in 50 y could possibly enjoy similar standards as Europe today. In
the case of Pakistan (Fig. 6), the contrast between the two scenarios
implying very different futures is comparable.
Which of these two very different future scenarios is more likely?
Both Nigeria and Pakistan have fundamentalist groups that directly
attack any efforts to educate girls. The name of the Nigerian insurgent
group Boko Haram means in translation “education is sin” or
“books are sin.” In Pakistan, Malala Yousafzei was shot in the
head at the age of 14 by a group related to the Taliban simply
because she wanted more girls to go to school. Resisting modern
education, which is regarded as the source of all unbelief, is often
at the heart of the rejection of the West by such groups: this
points at a possible self-reinforcing vicious cycle driven by the
link between population growth and lack of female education.
Religious fanaticism often recruits its followers in places where
many people live in poverty, where there are low levels of edu-
cation and high population growth. Hence, the rapid expansion
of female education that would be necessary to fight the latter
can be seriously hampered by fundamentalist movements that in
turn benefit from high population growth, low education, and the
resulting unemployment. Given these forces, further progress in
such countries as Nigeria and Pakistan is by no means guaran-
teed. If the spread of education stalls, the population continues to
grow rapidly, and political insecurity hinders investment and the
creation of jobs, this can lead into a bleak future that will not leave
the rest of the increasingly globalized world unaffected (11).
Education and Adaptation to Climate Change
Recently, in the analysis of climate change, the attention has shifted
from an earlier almost exclusive focus on mitigation to adaptation
that will be necessary when coping with already unavoidable
changes of the climate. However, much of the ongoing research
in the field superimposes projected biophysical conditions onto
present-day socioeconomic conditions (67), when we know that
societies are also changing over time in dimensions, such as public
health capabilities that are essential for their adaptive capacity.
Disregarding such future social change is misleading. It has been
demonstrated recently that education is a key determinant of dif-
ferential vulnerability, both at the individual and societal level (68).
Hence, the demographic metabolism model and the associated SSP
scenarios are an effective way for forecasting societies’ future
adaptive capacities to climate change (39). When contrasting the
SSP1 and SSP3 scenarios for the rest of the century (69), it was
recently shown that because of the educational expansion under the
rapid social development path in SSP1, disaster mortality will be
much lower—even in the case of increasing climate related hazard—
than in the SSP3 scenario, where underinvestment in education
leads to high population growth and heightened vulnerability.
Given the uncertainty about the precise manifestations of climate
change in specific areas, there is a strong case to be made for
general empowerment through education, which increases human
and social capital to flexibly and effectively react to upcoming
challenges rather than investing in massive concrete infrastructure
projects. The implications of these findings for the allocation of
resources, such as the pledged $100 billion per year of the Green
Fig. 5. SSP1 (Left) and SSP3 (Right) for Nigeria. Data from Klingholtz and
Lutz (11).
Fig. 6. SSP1 (Left) and SSP3 (Right) for Pakistan. Data from Klingholtz and
Lutz (11).
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Climate Fund to help developing countries with adaptation, are
significant. The subtitle of the relevant paper in Science succinctly
summarizes this in “Fund more educators rather than just engi-
neers” (69).
More generally, for the interactions of humans with environ-
mental change, education has been shown to matter for behavioral
changes necessary to mitigate human impacts, such as changing
behaviors in terms of choosing greener technologies, switching to
public transport, or recycling waste (39). Because education im-
proves knowledge, understanding of complex information, effi-
ciency in allocation of resources, and capacity to plan for the
future (70, 71), it is conducive for making better choices at the
individual and societal level that will make a transition toward
sustainability more likely.
Dematerialization in Aging and Shrinking Populations
A recognition of the world’s increasing ecological problems has
also triggered discussions about alternatives to the currently
dominant neoclassical economic growth model. This goes back
partly to the thinking of classic economists, such as Adam Smith
and David Ricardo, and their concept of a steady-state economy,
and has also led to the rather young field of ecological eco-
nomics and the notion of “degrowth.” Critics of the steady-state
economy, on the other hand, argue that technological development
and market mechanism will be capable of overcoming resource
scarcity, pollution, or the effects of continued population growth.
The combined effects of population growth (P), affluence (A),
and technology (T) on environmental impact (I) has sometimes
been expressed through the “I = PAT” identity. Called the Ehrlich-
Holdren or Kaya identity, it lends itself to efforts of quantification
of the shares of the contribution of the individual components. The
decomposition literature based on this identity has, however, been
inconclusive because of the fact that the three components tend to
work in different directions, are not independent from each other,
and not all consumption can be meaningfully attributed to indi-
viduals. In particular, it has been pointed out that households and
not individuals should be taken as the consuming units and that the
consumption or impacts of big companies or the military cannot be
meaningfully attributed to individuals. But despite some of these
problems, the literature mostly agrees that population change and
change in consumption patterns are both relevant aspects, even
though the latter tends to dominate the picture (72).
If the fertility transition around the world continues, in the very
long run world population will peak and eventually start to decline
(68). Because of uncertainty about fertility stalls in some African
countries, which are likely a late consequence of education stalls
associated with structural adjustment programs in the 1980s (73),
there have recently been some upward adjustments in long-term
population projections. However, recent calculations of the impact
of meeting the SDGs (64) and an accelerated fertility decline in
Africa (74) show again a much lower path of population growth.
Very long-run scenarios assuming that the global average fertility
by the end of this century will be at the average European level of
today—with East Asia already being below that level—will result in
total world population sizes of 2–6 billion in 2200, depending on
the maximum life expectancy that is being assumed (75). Based on
this, I had titled an editorial for the Royal Statistical Society
“Towards a world of 2–4 billion well educated and therefore heathy
and wealthy people” (76), and based on my more recent work,
cited above, I could now add “. . . that would be able to cope well
with the consequences of already unavoidable climate change.”
This priority focus on education and health in efforts to de-
materialize further increases in human well-being also holds for
highly developed and rapidly aging societies.
In 2014, eight European Academies coordinated by the Ger-
man Leopoldina issued a joint policy statement about the chal-
lenges and opportunities for aging societies. This consensus
statement explicitly points at the sustainable development
implications of these trends, stating: “Population change in the
21st century is to be placed in the context of consumption and
environmental protection within Europe as well as around the
world. Economic and social systems need to be reorganized in a
way so as not to depend on continued increases in non-renewable
material consumption. Europe may take these population changes
also as a starting point towards furthering investment in non-
material, high quality growth” (77). The statement also stresses
that in a globalizing world, with an economy that is increasingly
technology-based, the cognitive resources of societies will be a key
factor in international competitiveness, and hence for maintaining
the wealth of European economies. It also stresses that well-being
not only encompasses physical health but importantly also cogni-
tive functioning and mental health. In these policy recommenda-
tions for advanced and rapidly aging European societies—perhaps
surprisingly to some—emphasis is put on the importance of edu-
cation for all, including eradication of functional illiteracy and the
development of continuous education (lifelong learning). Hence,
this eight academies statement clearly identifies universal educa-
tion and health as priorities for Europe in the 21st century.
My Personal Learning Curve
Everybody has a personal bias when it comes to setting priorities
and for scientists there may also be a disciplinary bias. I certainly
did not start out as an education lover. Quite the opposite: the
very first piece that I published in a student journal had the title
“Elementary school: A crime on children” (78), addressing the
many frustrations I had experienced in my old-fashioned primary
school. I studied philosophy, theology, and mathematics, and
then—inspired by the 1972 report of the Club of Rome (79)—
decided to focus on statistics and systems modeling, which seemed
to offer the most appropriate tools for comprehensively studying
the future challenges of humanity. For a sharper disciplinary focus,
I went for the mathematics of groups of people: that is, de-
mography. Later I had the opportunity to join the International
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Austria, an institute that
had been set up in 1972 to do such comprehensive global
systems modeling.
To better understand the complex dynamics of population–
development–environment interactions in my first major in-
dependent study, I developed a systems model for the island of
Mauritius, a microcosm with good historical data. In the 1960s
Mauritius had been desperately poor and served as a textbook
example of a country trapped in the vicious circle generated by
rapid population growth, extreme poverty, limited land, and envi-
ronmental degradation, and to top it off, was frequently hit by
ferocious cyclones (80). In the 1970s the island experienced a re-
cord breaking fertility decline from over six to around three chil-
dren in just a decade, and came out of poverty mostly through an
export-oriented textile industry, which through the associated
heavy water pollution, was about to seriously harm the unique
coastal ecosystems on which the incipient luxury tourism depended.
In 1990 my team built detailed models of the interacting water,
land-use, population, and economic systems to address these future
challenges and to reconstruct how Mauritius had escaped the
poverty trap (18). Unlike other models at the time, ours also in-
cluded the educational composition as well as social, political, and
institutional dimensions. Through extensive sensitivity analyses of
alternative histories and futures, we tried to find out which policy
variables were the most important in triggering lasting improve-
ments in the well-being of the entire population. This resulted in a
decisive insight: no matter how we twisted the model or defined
alternative scenarios, the key driver of the past success always
turned out to be female education (more than male) and family
planning, and the key driver of future economic growth and envi-
ronmental preservation was further investment in human capital.
Fortunately, Mauritius continued to follow this path and today is
one of the most developed countries in the entire Africa region,
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based not only on up-scale tourism but more so on high-tech in-
dustry and services, quite a way from the “hell on earth,” as it is was
called in the 1960s.
The 1994 book summarizing these findings concludes: “With
respect to international development priorities, this suggests a
radical change of emphasis. Less attention should be given to
large-scale projects . . . (but) to investment into human resources—
education, health and family planning. . . . It is a very robust policy
that may only show modest immediate results, but a great payoff in
the long run” (18). This was my systems-analysis–based conversion
from seeing basic education as a nuisance to seeing it as the key
prerequisite for successful human and sustainable development.
Over the following two decades, the robustness of this finding
was tested empirically in many more case studies around the world
(81), and I did not find a single example in which empowerment
through basic education was not among the very top factors that
mattered for many of the other desirable outcomes. The only
competitor for first place was basic health, with income typically
coming further down. And once you consider in your model ed-
ucation as a possible driver, it comes out dominating even in fields
that seem to be far away from social development. Pascal Lamy,
former head of the World Trade Organization, calls education the
single most important factor in international trade policy.*
Why have most other researchers not reached the same con-
clusion, particularly because, globally, surveys show that the gen-
eral public clearly prioritizes education and health (82)? A
plausible answer could be that many analyses do not even include
education in the model, and consequently cannot come to the
conclusion that it is the key factor. A good example for this can be
found in the mainstream work on vulnerability to natural disasters
where education has typically not been on the table as a relevant
variable to be studied. If education data are collected and it is
properly included in the model, the results typically show that it is
more important than income or other conventionally considered
factors (68). The results of the many studies conducted in different
parts of the world show that more education and better education
does not necessarily and linearly always lead to success, but it is an
indispensable prerequisite and significantly raises the chances for
success in terms of sustainably increasing human well-being.
Science and Policy Implications
As of January 2017, I have been appointed by the United Nations
to be a member of a “Group of 15 Independent Scientists”
charged with monitoring the implementation of the SDGs and
drafting the quadrennial Global Sustainable Development Report
to be presented to all heads of state and government at the
General Assembly in 2019, without preceding government nego-
tiations and agreement. This presents an innovation in United
Nations procedures that finally gives independent science an in-
dependent say. It is a great opportunity and a great challenge. One
of the main tasks will be to not look at the SDGs in isolation but
study their synergies and possible contradictions. We will also have
to address the question of SDG priorities from a science and
policy perspective.
It terms of policy priorities, it is evident that currently not all 17
SDGs receive equal attention or funding. Because of the bottom-
up somewhat unsystematic nature of the 17 goals and 169 targets,
it is difficult to argue that they all should receive equal funding.
Actually, in this contribution I argue for priority funding for basic
education and basic health. Although basic health has seen strong
increases in international funding—not least by private sources,
such as the Gates Foundation—basic education is woefully under-
funded, particularly in countries affected by conflict. The Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development statistics of
all international development assistance show that over the past
years, a mere 2–4% has been spent on basic education (11). It is
important to stress that spending alone is not enough, if the funds
are not effectively allocated and consequently do not lead to
better learning outcomes, as has partly been the case in the past.
The science-based case presented here would strongly support a
massive new global effort for universal basic education, leading to
effective learning outcomes.
What all of the SDGs have in common is that they require
changes in human behavior in one way or another. And such
changes in the end need to happen in the human mind. They are
conscious processes of making choices with a view to the future.
Luther, 500 y ago, made his choices based on religious insights and
convictions. The world today is immensely more complex and
rapid changes in society and human impacts on the environment
make it necessary to explicitly and systemically think about the
future. Because this future will be different from today, it cannot
yet be experienced with our senses. We need to be able to ab-
stractly think the counterfactual. If we do not think ahead and do
not consider the necessity of maintaining functioning natural life
support systems, we or our decedents will likely hit a wall and
suffer the pains. Thus, it is in the end down to abstract cognitive
processes in our brains that combine our insights about where
current trends will get us and what future we prefer, that results in
actual behavior. For these choices to be reasonable, and to our
own and our societies’ benefit, we need as most fundamental
prerequisites to have a healthy body with a functioning brain
(sanitas), as well as a brain that is trained to think abstractly and
educated to structure information in a meaningful way (schola). To
secure these prerequisites requires some initial efforts, but then the
good news is that brain power is one of the few resources that are
not exhausted by being used: quite the opposite, it is strengthened
by being used.
Please note: a more extensive treatment of the topics presented
in this article is given in a forthcoming popular science book,
Education First: From Martin Luther to Sustainable Development,
by Wolfgang Lutz and Reiner Klingholz (83).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. I thank Stephanie Bengtsson, Raya Muttarak, Ingol-
führ Blühdorn, William Butz, and Bilal Barakat for helpful comments; and
Stefanie Andruchowitz for efficient support. Partial funding for this work
came from an Advanced Grant of the European Research Council “Forecasting
Societies’ Adaptive Capacities to Climate Change” Grant ERC-2008-AdG
230195-FutureSoc, and the “Wittgenstein Award” of the Austrian Science
Fund (FWF): Z171-G11.
1. Körtner U (2016) Die Rechtfertigungslehre als Zentrum der Theologie Martin Luthers.
Amt Gem 66:180–193.
2. Clark WC (2007) Sustainability science: A room of its own. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 104:
1737–1738.
3. Arrow KJ, Dasgupta P, Goulder LH, Mumford KJ, Oleson K (2012) Sustainability and
the measurement of wealth. Environ Dev Econ 17:317–353.
4. Dasgupta P (2014) Inclusive Wealth Report 2014: Measuring Progress Toward
Sustainability (United Nations University and International Human Dimensions Pro-
gramme on Global Environmental Change, Bonn, Germany).
5. Lutz W (2013) Demographic metabolism: A predictive theory of socioeconomic
change. Popul Dev Rev 38:283–301.
6. Easterly W (2013) The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten
Rights of the Poor (Basic Books, New York).
7. Moyo D (2010) Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for
Africa (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York).
8. UNESCO (2016) Education for People and Planet: Creating Sustainable Futures for All
(United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris).
9. Missiou A (2011) Literacy and Democracy in Fifth-Century Athens (Cambridge Univ
Press, New York).
10. Aland K (1990) Luther Deutsch. Die Werke Martin Luthers in neuer Auswahl fuer die
Gegenwart. Band 5: Die Schriftauslegung (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, Germany).
11. Klingholz R, Lutz W (2016) Wer überlebt? Bildung entscheidet über die Zukunft der
Menschheit (Campus, Frankfurt am Main, Germany).
12. Dilba E (2008) Typographie-Lexikon (Books on Demand, Norderstedt, Germany).
13. Broadberry S, O’Rourke KH (2010) The Cambridge Economic History of Modern
Europe: Volume 1, 1700–1870 (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
*Lamy P, Laxenburg-Alpbach Group Retreat: New Business Models for Sustainable Devel-
opment, August 28–30, 2016, Alpbach, Austria.
Lutz PNAS Early Edition | 9 of 10
SU
ST
A
IN
A
BI
LI
TY
SC
IE
N
CE
IN
A
U
G
U
RA
L
A
RT
IC
LE
14. Becker SO, Woessmann L (2009) Was Weber wrong? A human capital theory of
Protestant economic history. Q J Econ 124:531–596.
15. Todd E (1987) The Causes of Progress: Culture, Authority, and Change (Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, UK).
16. Lutz W (2009) Sola schola et sanitate: Human capital as the root cause and priority for
international development? Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 364:3031–3047.
17. Goldin C, Katz LF (2008) The Race Between Education and Technology (Belknap Press,
Cambridge, MA).
18. Lutz W, ed (1994) Population, Development, Environment: Understanding Their
Interactions in Mauritius (Springer, Berlin).
19. de la Fuente A, Doménech R (2006) Human capital in growth regressions: How much
difference does data quality make? J Eur Econ Assoc 4:1–36.
20. Cohen D, Soto M (2007) Growth and human capital: Good data, good results. J Econ
Growth 12:51–76.
21. Pritchett L (2001) Where has all the education gone? World Bank Econ Rev 15:
367–391.
22. Lutz W, Cuaresma JC, Sanderson W (2008) Economics. The demography of educa-
tional attainment and economic growth. Science 319:1047–1048.
23. Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson JA (2005) Institutions as a fundamental cause of
long-run growth. Handbook of Economic Growth, eds Aghion P, Durlauf SN (Elsevier,
Amsterdam), pp 385–472.
24. Lipset SM (1959) Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and
political legitimacy. Am Polit Sci Rev 53:69–105.
25. Glaeser EL, Ponzetto GAM, Shleifer A (2007) Why does democracy need education?
J Econ Growth 12:77–99.
26. Barro RJ (1996) Democracy and growth. J Econ Growth 1:1–27.
27. Lutz W, Cuaresma JC, Abbasi-Shavazi MJ (2010) Demography, education, and de-
mocracy: Global trends and the case of Iran. Popul Dev Rev 36:253–281.
28. Lutz W, Kc S (2011) Global human capital: Integrating education and population.
Science 333:587–592.
29. Mannheim K (1952) The problem of generations. Essays on the Sociology of
Knowledge by Karl Mannheim, ed Kecskemeti P (Routledge & Kegan Paul, New
York), pp 276–332.
30. Ryder NB (1965) The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. Am Sociol Rev
30:843–861.
31. Ryder NB (1980) The Cohort Approach: Essays in the Measurement of Temporal
Variations in Demographic Behavior (Ayer Publishing, New York).
32. Keyfitz N (1985) Applied Mathematical Demography (Springer, New York), 2nd Ed.
33. Inglehart R (1995) Public support for environmental protection: Objective problems
and subjective values in 43 societies. PS Polit Sci Polit 28:57–72.
34. Brooks C, Bolzendahl C (2004) The transformation of US gender role attitudes: Cohort
replacement, social-structural change, and ideological learning. Soc Sci Res 33:106–133.
35. Pampel F (2011) Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in
cross-national perspective. Demogr Res 25:667–694.
36. Andersen R, Fetner T (2008) Cohort differences in tolerance of homosexuality attitudinal
change in Canada and the United States, 1981–2000. Public Opin Q 72:311–330.
37. Lutz W, Kritzinger S, Skirbekk V (2006) Population. The demography of growing
European identity. Science 314:425.
38. Striessnig E, Lutz W (2016) Demographic strengthening of European identity. Popul
Dev Rev 42:305–311.
39. Lutz W, Muttarak R (2017) Forecasting societies’ adaptive capacities through a de-
mographic metabolism model. Nat Clim Chang 7:177–184.
40. Blair C, Gamson D, Thorne S, Baker D (2005) Rising mean IQ: Cognitive demand of
mathematics education for young children, population exposure to formal schooling,
and the neurobiology of the prefrontal cortex. Intelligence 33:93–106.
41. Baker DP, Salinas D, Eslinger PJ (2012) An envisioned bridge: Schooling as a neuro-
cognitive developmental institution. Dev Cogn Neurosci 2:S6–S17.
42. Brinch CN, Galloway TA (2012) Schooling in adolescence raises IQ scores. Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 109:425–430.
43. Lewis CM, Baldassarre A, Committeri G, Romani GL, Corbetta M (2009) Learning
sculpts the spontaneous activity of the resting human brain. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
106:17558–17563.
44. Peters E, et al. (2006) Numeracy and decision making. Psychol Sci 17:407–413.
45. Brunello G, Fort M, Schneeweis N, Winter-Ebmer R (2016) The causal effect of edu-
cation on health: What is the role of health behaviors? Health Econ 25:314–336.
46. Conti G, Heckman J, Urzua S (2010) The education-health gradient. Am Econ Rev 100:
234–238.
47. Grandjean P, Landrigan PJ (2014) Neurobehavioural effects of developmental toxic-
ity. Lancet Neurol 13:330–338.
48. Pamuk ER, Fuchs R, Lutz W (2011) Comparing relative effects of education and economic
resources on infant mortality in developing countries. Popul Dev Rev 37:637–664.
49. Fuchs R, Pamuk E, Lutz W (2010) Education or wealth: Which matters more for re-
ducing child mortality in developing countries? Vienna Yearb Popul Res 8:175–199.
50. Caselli G, Drefahl S, Wegner-Siegmundt C, Luy M (2014) Future mortality in low
mortality countries. World Population and Human Capital in the 21st Century, eds
Lutz W, Butz WP, Samir KC (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford), pp 226–272.
51. Shkolnikov VM, et al. (2006) The changing relation between education and life ex-
pectancy in central and eastern Europe in the 1990s. J Epidemiol Community Health
60:875–881.
52. Case A, Deaton A (2015) Rising morbidity and mortality in midlife among white non-
Hispanic Americans in the 21st century. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 112:15078–15083.
53. Chen Q, Eggleston K, Zhang W, Zhao J, Zhou S (May 15, 2017) The educational gra-
dient in health in China. China Q, 10.1017/S0305741017000613.
54. Winkler-Dworak M (2008) The low mortality of a learned society. Eur J Popul 24:
405–424.
55. Lutz W (2011) Zukunft durch globale Bildung: Neue wissenschaftliche Befunde.
Österreichische Akademie Der Wissenschaften, Almanach 2011, 161. Jahrgang, ed
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Österreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Vienna), pp 371–386.
56. Bloom DE, Canning D, Sevilla J (2003) The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective
on the Economic Consequences of Population Change (Rand, Santa Monica, CA).
57. Sachs JD (2001) Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic
Development (World Health Organization, Geneva).
58. Skirbekk V (2008) Fertility trends by social status. Demogr Res 18:145–180.
59. Fuchs R, Goujon A (2014) Future fertility in high fertility countries. World Population
and Human Capital in the 21st Century, eds Lutz W, Butz WP, Samir KC (Oxford Univ
Press, Oxford), pp 147–225.
60. Sobotka T, Beaujouan É (2014) Two is best? The persistence of a two-child family ideal
in Europe. Popul Dev Rev 40:391–419.
61. Lutz W (2014) A population policy rationale for the twenty-first century. Popul Dev
Rev 40:527–544.
62. Lutz W, Butz WP, Samir KC, eds (2014) World Population and Human Capital in the
21st Century (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford).
63. Bongaarts J (2010) The causes of educational differences in fertility in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Vienna Yearb Popul Res 8:31–50.
64. Abel GJ, Barakat B, Kc S, Lutz W (2016) Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals
leads to lower world population growth. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 113:14294–14299.
65. Riahi K, et al. (2017) The shared socioeconomic pathways and their energy, land use, and
greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview. Glob Environ Change 42:153–168.
66. Kc S, Lutz W (2017) The human core of the shared socioeconomic pathways: Pop-
ulation scenarios by age, sex and level of education for all countries to 2100. Glob
Environ Change 42:181–192.
67. IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global
and Sectoral Aspects. Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge Univ Press, New York).
68. Butz WP, Lutz W, Sendzimir J, eds (2014) Education and differential vulnerability to
natural disasters (Resilience Alliance). Special Issue, Ecology and Society. Available at
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/view.php?sf=73, www.iiasa.ac.at/publication/
more_RP-14-001.php. Accessed February 17, 2017.
69. Lutz W, Muttarak R, Striessnig E (2014) Environment and development. Universal
education is key to enhanced climate adaptation. Science 346:1061–1062.
70. Cutler DM, Lleras-Muney A (2010) Understanding differences in health behaviors by
education. J Health Econ 29:1–28.
71. van der Pol M (2011) Health, education and time preference. Health Econ 20:917–929.
72. O’Neill BC, MacKellar FL, Lutz W (2005) Population and Climate Change (Cambridge
Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
73. Goujon A, Lutz W, KC S (2015) Education stalls and subsequent stalls in African fer-
tility: A descriptive overview. Demogr Res 33:1281–1296.
74. Gerland P, Biddlecom A, Kantorová V (2016) Patterns of fertility decline and the
impact of alternative scenarios of future fertility change in sub-Saharan Africa. Popul
Dev Rev 43:21–38.
75. Basten S, Lutz W, Scherbov S (2013) Very long range global population scenarios to
2300 and the implications of sustained low fertility. Demogr Res 28:1145–1166.
76. Lutz W (2009) Editorial: Towards a world of 2–6 billion well-educated and therefore
healthy and wealthy people. J R Stat Soc Ser A Stat Soc 172:701–705.
77. Leopoldina (2014) Mastering Demographic Change in Europe (German National Acad-
emy of Sciences Leopoldina, Halle, Germany) Available at https://www.leopoldina.org/
uploads/tx_leopublication/2014_Joint_Statement_Demographic_Change_ALLEA.pdf.
Accessed February 17, 2017.
78. Lutz W (1972) Volksschule, ein Verbrechen am Kind [Elementary school: A crime on
children]. Informationen Schuelerzeitung Schottengymnasiums Wien 1:2–4.
79. Meadows DH, Meadows DL, Randers J, Behrens WW, III (1972) The Limits to Growth:
A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (Universe
Books, New York).
80. Meade JE, et al. (1968) The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius (Frank Cass,
London).
81. Lutz W, Sanderson WC, Wils A (2002) Conclusions: Toward comprehensive P-E studies.
Popul Dev Rev 28:225–250.
82. United Nations (2017) MY World. Available at data.myworld2015.org/. Accessed
February 17, 2017.
83. Lutz W, Klingholz R (2017) Education First: From Martin Luther to Sustainable
Development (African Sun MeDIA, Stellenbosch, South Africa).
10 of 10 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1702609114 Lutz
